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At least on the surface, most cyber attacks appear to be clearly unethical as well as 
illegal. These include attacks performed for amusement or bragging rights, such as 
web defacements conducted “just for fun” and computer viruses launched out of 
curiosity but disregard for their consequences. They also include attacks done for 
personal gain, such as system intrusions to steal credit card numbers and trade 
secrets; denial-of-service attacks aimed at taking out competitor websites or extorting 
money from victims; and attacks that compromise and deploy large “botnets” of 
victim computers to send out spam or amplify denial-of-service attacks. 
 
There are, however, three areas of cyber conflict where the ethical issues are more 
problematic. The first is cyber warfare at the state level when conducted in the 
interests of national security. Some of the questions raised in this context include: Is 
it ethical for a state to penetrate or disable the computer systems of an adversary state 
that has threatened its territorial or political integrity? If so, what are the ground rules 
for such attacks? Can cyber soldiers attack critical infrastructures such as 
telecommunications and electric power that serve both civilian and military 
functions? If a nation is under cyber assault from another country, under what 
conditions can it respond in kind or use armed force against the assailant? Can it 
attack computers in a third country whose computer networks have been 
compromised or exploited to facilitate the assault?  
 
The second area with ethical dilemmas involves non-state actors whose cyber attacks 
are politically or socially motivated. This domain of conflict is often referred to as 
“hacktivism,” as it represents a confluence of hacking with activism. If the attacks are 
designed to be sufficiently destructive as to severely harm and terrorize civilians, they 
become “cyberterrorism” – the integration of cyber attacks with terrorism. While 
cyberterrorism is abhorrent and clearly unethical, hacktivism raises ethical questions. 
For example: Is it ethical for a group of hackers to take down a website that is being 
used primarily to trade child pornography, traffic in stolen credit card numbers, or 
support terrorist operations? Can the hacktivists protest the policies or practices of 
governments or corporations by defacing websites or conducting web “sit-ins?” Can 
they attack vulnerable machines in order to expose security holes with the goal of 
making the Internet more secure? 
 
Finally, the third area involves the ethics of cyber defense, particularly what is called 
“hack back,” “strike back,” or “active response.” If a system is under cyber attack, 
can the system administrators attack back in order to stop it? What if the attack is 
coming from computers that may themselves be victims of compromise? Since many 
attacks are routed through chains of compromised machines, can a victim “hack 
back” along the chain in order to determine the source?  
 
This paper explores ethical issues in each of these areas of cyber conflict. The 
objective is not to answer the questions listed above, but rather to offer an ethical 
framework in which they can be addressed. Examples are used to illustrate the 
principles, but no attempt is made to reach a final ethical decision. To do so would 
require a much more thorough analysis of the nature of a particular cyber attack and 
the context in which it is used. 
 
The framework presented here is based on the international law of armed conflict. 
Although this law was developed to address armed attacks and the use of primarily 
armed force, some work has been done to interpret the law in the domain of cyber 
conflict. The law has two parts: jus ad bellum, or the law of conflict management, and 
jus in bello, or the law of war. Despite being referred to as “law,” both of these are as 
much about ethical behavior as they are rules of law.  
 
The international law of armed conflict applies to nation states, and thus concerns 
cyber warfare at the state level. The paper will extend this framework to politically 
and socially motivated cyber attacks by non-state actors, and compare this approach 
with some previous work on the ethics of cyber activism and civil disobedience. It 
will also apply the international law of armed conflict to the domain of cyber defense, 
and show how it ties in with the legal doctrine of self-defense and relates to other 
work on hack back. 
 
Thus, for all three areas, the paper builds on the ethical principles encoded in the 
international law of armed conflict, and interpretation of those principles in the cyber 
domain. In this way, the paper approaches the three areas of cyber attack more as 
domains of conflict, especially international conflict, than as domains of crime—even 
though the acts themselves may also violate criminal statutes. 
 
There are several areas of cyber conflict the paper does not address. Besides cyber 
attacks conducted for pleasure or personal gain, the paper does not consider revenge 
attacks by insiders—all of which are generally regarded as unethical. In addition, the 
paper does not address methods of cyber conflict other than cyber attacks, for 
example, messages transmitted for the purpose of psychological operations or 
deception. While these other types of activity raise important ethical issues, their 
treatment is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
Cyber Warfare at the State Level 
 
The law of international conflict consists of two parts: jus ad bellum, or the law of 
conflict management, and jus in bello, or the law of war. Both are concerned with the 
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use of force, particularly armed forces, but the former specifies when that force may 
be applied, while the latter specifies ground rules for how it should be applied. Both 
are about ethical principles as much as they are about “law,” and indeed, international 
law does not carry the same weight as domestic law. Under international law, states, 
as sovereign entities, assume international legal obligations only by affirmatively 
agreeing to them, for example, signing a treaty or agreeing to abide by the Charter of 
the United Nations. They are free to decline participation, and they are free to back 
out later. By contrast, under domestic laws, the citizens of a country are vulnerable to 
prosecution for violating any laws, regardless of whether they agree with them, and 
regardless of whether the laws are even just. 
 
The law of international conflict is designed to promote peace and minimize the 
adverse effects of war on the world. As a general rule, states are not permitted to 
attack other states, except as a means of self-defense. Where conflict does arise, the 
law is intended to ensure that wars are fought as humanely as possible, minimizing 
collateral damage (harm to civilians and civilian property). Thus, the international 
law of armed conflict tends to prescribe widely accepted ethical principles. 
 
Jus ad Bellum – The Law of Conflict Management 
 
The law of conflict management is primarily concerned with the application of force, 
particularly armed force. It is codified in the United Nations Charter and specifies the 
conditions under which member states may apply force against other states. The most 
relevant parts of the Charter are Articles 2(4), 39, and 51. 
 
Article 2(4) prohibits states from using force against other states: 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
 
Although the nature of this force is left somewhat open, it may include more than just 
the use of armed force, as other parts of the Charter explicitly refer to armed force. 
However, it is not so broad as to cover generally lawful activity such as boycotts, 
economic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, and interruption of 
communications. (Wingfield, 2000, p. 90)  
 
Article 39 assigns the U.N. Security Council responsibility for responding to threats 
and acts of aggression: 
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
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Although a wide variety of acts can plausibly be interpreted as a “threat to the peace,” 
the term “aggression” is defined in a U.N. General Assembly resolution as “the use of 
armed force” by a member or non-member state. It includes invasions, attacks, 
bombardments, and blockades by armed military forces and other groups, including 
mercenaries. Article 41 refers to responses other than armed force, for example 
“complete or partial interruption of economic relations and means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Article 42 refers to the use of air, sea, and 
land forces, including demonstrations, blockades, and other operations. 
 
While Article 2(4) prohibits states from launching offensive attacks, Article 51 
acknowledges a right to self-defense against armed attacks:  
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
 
Although Article 51 states that defensive measures, including the use of force, are 
allowed after a state has been attacked, it is generally understood that states also have 
a right of “anticipatory self-defense;” that is, they can take pre-emptive action to avert 
a strike. They are also permitted to exercise “self-defense in neutral territory.” This 
means they can use force against a threat operating in a neutral state when that state is 
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory as a base or sanctuary for 
attacks. (DoD OGC, 1999, p. 14)   
 
In summary, the UN Charter prohibits states from using force against other states 
(Article 2(4)), except when conducted in self defense (Article 51) or under the 
auspices of the Security Council (Article 39). The Charter effectively encodes an 
ethical principle of just cause for attacking another state that most people would 
accept. States have a moral right to defend themselves against acts and threats of 
aggression, but they do not have the right to engage in unprovoked aggression. The 
use of force is permissible only as a means of defending against aggression. 
 
In order to apply these legal/ethical principles to cyber warfare, we must first 
determine whether cyber attacks constitute the use of force. If they do, then they 
would fall under the UN Charter along with armed force, implying that cyber attacks 
at the state level would be justified only as a means of defense. But if they are not 
considered to be a form of force, the ethical issues regarding their application are 
more ambiguous, falling closer to the issues raised by “softer” forms of coercion such 
as trade restrictions and severance of diplomatic relations. 
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When Does a Cyber Attack Constitute the Use of Force? 
 
Not all cyber attacks are equal. The impact of a cyber attack that denies access to a 
news website for one hour would be relatively minor compared to one that interferes 
with air traffic control and causes planes to crash. Indeed, the effects of the latter 
would be comparable to the application of force to shoot down planes. Thus, what is 
needed is not a single answer to the question of whether cyber attacks involve the use 
of force, but a framework for evaluating a particular attack or class of attacks. 
 
For this, we turn to the work of Michael Schmitt, Professor of International Law and 
Director of the Program in Advanced Security Studies at the George G. Marshall 
European Center for Security Studies in Germany. In a 1999 paper, Schmitt, formerly 
a law professor at both the US Naval War College and the US Air Force Academy, 
offered seven criteria for distinguishing operations that use force from economic, 
diplomatic, and other soft measures. (Schmitt, 1999) For each criterion, there is a 
spectrum of consequences, the high end resembling the use of force and the low end 
resembling soft measures. The following description is based on both Schmitt’s paper 
and the work of Thomas Wingfield, author of The Law of Information Conflict. 
(Wingfield, 2000, 120-127) 
 
1. Severity. This refers to people killed or wounded and property damage. The 
premise is that armed attacks that use force often produce extensive casualties 
or property damage, whereas soft measures do not. 
 
2. Immediacy. This is the time it takes for the consequences of an operation to 
take effect. As a general rule, armed attacks that use force have immediate 
effects, on the order of seconds to minutes, while softer measures, such as 
trade restrictions, may not be felt for weeks or months. 
 
3. Directness. This is the relationship between an operation and its effects. For 
an armed attack, effects are generally caused by and attributable to the 
application of force, whereas for softer measures there could be multiple 
explanations. 
 
4. Invasiveness. This refers to whether an operation involved crossing borders 
into the target country. In general, an armed attack crosses borders physically, 
whereas softer measures are implemented from within the borders of a 
sponsoring country. 
 
5. Measurability. This is the ability to measure the effects of an operation. The 
premise is that the effects of armed attacks are more readily quantified 
(number of casualties, dollar value of property damage) than softer measures, 
for example severing diplomatic relations. 
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6. Presumptive Legitimacy. This refers to whether an operation is considered 
legitimate within the international community. Whereas the use of armed 
force is generally unlawful absent some justifiable reason such as self-
defense, the use of soft measures are generally lawful absent some 
prohibition.  
 
7. Responsibility. This refers to the degree to which the consequence of an action 
can be attributed to a state as opposed to other actors. The premise is that 
armed coercion is within the exclusive province of states and is more 
susceptible to being charged to states, whereas non-state actors are capable of 
engaging in such soft activity as propaganda and boycotts. 
 
To see how these criteria could apply to a cyber attack, consider an intrusion into an 
air traffic control system that causes two large planes to enter the same airspace and 
collide, leading to the deaths of 500 persons on board the two aircraft. In terms of 
severity, the cyber attack clearly ranks high. Immediacy is also high, although the 
delay between the intrusion and the crash may be somewhat longer than between 
something like a missile strike and the planes crashing. With respect to directness, let 
us assume the reason for the crash is clear from information in the air traffic control 
computers and the black boxes on board the planes, so directness ranks high. 
Invasiveness, however, is moderate, requiring only an electronic invasion rather than 
a physical one. Measurability, on the other hand, is high: 500 people dead and two 
planes destroyed. Presumptive legitimacy is also high in that the act would be 
regarded as illegitimate, akin to a missile attack (the high end of the spectrum 
corresponds to high illegitimacy). Responsibility comes out moderate to high. In 
principle, the perpetrator could be anyone, but the level of skill and knowledge 
required to carry out this attack would rule out most hackers, suggesting state 
sponsorship. In summary, five criteria (severity, immediacy, directness, presumptive 
legitimacy, and measurability) rank high, while two rank at least moderate 
(invasiveness and responsibility). Thus, the attack looks more like the application of 
force than a softer, more legitimate form of coercion. 
 
Now, consider a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against a key 
government website that exploits a botnet of hundreds or thousands of compromised 
computers (“zombies”) and makes the site inaccessible for one day. This would likely 
rank low to moderate on severity, but high on immediacy. Directness would be 
moderate to high. Although the effects could as easily be attributed to hardware or 
software malfunction, network monitoring and inspection of Internet logs would 
show the problem to be caused by a massive onslaught of traffic. Invasiveness would 
be about the same as in the previous scenario, namely moderate owing to the 
electronic penetration. Measurability would be high, as it is easy to determine the 
downtime of the target web server. Presumptive legitimacy would also score high, as 
DoS attacks, like force, are generally regarded as illegitimate and in violation of laws. 
Responsibility would be low to moderate. Some skill is required, but attribution 
would be difficult and many hackers would be capable of pulling it off. In summary, 
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the attack looks less like force than the one causing the plane crash in terms of 
severity and responsibility, but neither does it resemble legitimate measures. 
 
Wingfield suggests assigning a score for each criterion, say from 0 to 10. The idea is 
that high scores resemble force, whereas low scores resemble the softer measures 
such as economic and political ones. Under a “primary Schmitt analysis,” the seven 
scores are summed and the average taken. For a “secondary Schmitt analysis,” the 
criteria are assigned weights and the weighted average computed. This would allow 
severity, for example, to count more than the other criteria. An example with graphs 
showing the results of both primary and secondary Schmitt analyses is given in 
(Michael, 2003). 
 
To the extent that a particular cyber attack looks like the application of force, its 
application would violate Article 2(4), possibly triggering an Article 39 response 
from the UN Security Council or an Article 51 application of force in self-defense by 
the target. However, under Articles 39 and 51, cyber attacks that resemble force 
would be allowed as a means of defense against aggressors who use either physical or 
cyber force.  
 
On the other hand, if the attack looks more like legitimate, soft measures, than the use 
of force, then its application should not constitute a violation of Article 2(4). 
Moreover, if not deemed serious, it would likely not trigger an Article 39 response by 
the UN Security Council, as it would not be interpreted as a threat to the peace or act 
of aggression. Nor would it provide grounds for the target country to use force in its 
self-defense under Article 51. Of course, all this is theory. In practice, a nation that is 
the victim of a cyber attack may perceive it as an act of force worthy of a physical (or 
cyber) response, regardless of how the perpetrators score it under Schmitt’s criteria or 
any others. 
 
The ethical implications are that cyber attacks that resemble force are, like the use of 
physical force, morally justified only when they adhere to Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 of 
the UN Charter; that is, they are inherently defensive in nature. Unprovoked acts of 
aggression in cyberspace that resemble the use of force are not legally permissible  
 
Cyber attacks that fall below the Article 2(4) threshold for force are more likely to be 
ethical than attacks that cross the threshold, but they are not necessarily morally right. 
Their ethical implications must be examined like any other government action, for 
example, economic sanctions. However, in general it should be easier to justify cyber 
operations on ethical grounds as those operations move away from force on the 
spectrum of violence. 
 
Jus in Bello – The Law of War 
 
Whereas the jus ad bellum provides a legal framework for determining the lawfulness 
of a use of force, the jus in bello specifies four principles governing how that force 
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may be applied during armed conflict.  It applies to all parties of the conflict, 
including the aggressors as well as states operating out of self-defense under Article 
51 or in support of a UN operation under Article 39.  
 
Under the jus in bello, the legal – and ethical – question regarding a cyber attack is 
not whether it looks like force, because armed force is permissible, but whether the 
attack adheres to commonly accepted principles. These principles are embodied in 
treaties, including Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions, plus what is called 
“customary international law.” The latter consists of those practices that are so widely 
adhered to that they are considered to be legally binding. 
 
The U.S. Department of Defense summarizes the law of war with the following seven 
principles: (DoD OGC) 
 
1. Distinction of combatants from noncombatants. Only members of a nation’s 
regular armed forces may use force, and they must distinguish themselves 
and not hide behind civilians or civilian property. 
 
2. Military necessity. Targets of attack should make a direct contribution to the 
war effort or produce a military advantage.  
 
3. Proportionality. When attacking a lawful military target, collateral damage to 
noncombatants and civilian property should be proportionate to military 
advantage likely to be achieved. 
 
4. Indiscriminate weapons. Weapons that cannot be directed with any precision, 
such as bacteriological weapons, should be avoided.  
 
5. Superfluous injury. Weapons that cause catastrophic and untreatable injuries 
should not be used. 
 
6. Perfidy. Protected symbols should not be used to immunize military targets 
from attack, nor should one feign surrender or issue false reports of cease 
fires. 
 
7. Neutrality. Nations are entitled to immunity from attack if they do not assist 
either side; otherwise, they become legitimate targets. 
 
The first three principles essentially state that wars are to be conducted by military 
forces, and that attacks, whether kinetic or cyber, should be aimed at military targets 
rather than civilian ones. Cyber attacks against critical infrastructures such as civilian 
energy distribution, telecommunications, transportation, and financial systems would 
be permitted only if they did not cause unnecessary or disproportionate collateral 
damage to noncombatants and civilian property.  
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The first principle also says that military forces should identify themselves when they 
engage in attacks, thereby taking responsibility for their actions. Part of the 
motivation for this is so that targets will not blame innocent civilians or other states 
for attacks and then take actions against them. Applying this to cyberspace, this 
means that military cyber soldiers should not attack anonymously in a way that leaves 
open the possibility that they are operating as civilians or on behalf of another state. 
Because most attacks are conducted so as to avoid attribution, achieving this 
objective would require novel means and methods, for example, cyber weapons and 
attacks that carry a government logo or “flag,” or are clearly traceable to a military 
source. More fundamentally, it would also require a change in perspective, away 
from the notion that cyber attacks are necessarily covert operations towards one that 
favors open operations. Governments might oppose this, as it would leave them more 
open to counter attack. 
 
Although computer intrusions and denial-of-service attacks can be delivered with 
precision, some cyber weapons could be prohibited on the grounds of being 
indiscriminate. Most viruses and worms would fall in this category, as they are 
designed to spread to any vulnerable machine they can find. Viruses and worms 
might still be used, but they would have to be coded in a way that restricted their 
spread, say, to a target subnet.  
 
As for cyber weapons causing superfluous injury, there may not be any at this time. 
However, one could envision a cyber attack that caused such injury, for example, by 
altering the behavior of a surgical robot during an operation. 
 
There would be ample opportunity for committing perfidy in cyberspace. For 
example, one could hide Trojan horses on a bogus website that bore the Red Cross 
logo or place a fake notice of surrender from a wanted terrorist leader on websites 
used by him to distribute messages. Under the law of war, such acts are not allowed. 
 
The principle of neutrality protects neutral states from attack. To illustrate, suppose 
an adversary’s cyber attack packets travel through the telecommunications network of 
a neutral country. It would not be permissible to attack that network to stop the attack 
as long as the services are offered impartially to both sides and the neutral country is 
doing nothing more than relaying packets without regard to their content. On the 
other hand, if the adversary penetrated computers in the neutral country and used 
them to launch its strike, it would be permissible to launch a counter attack against 
those machines if the neutral country refused or was unable to help. 
 
In general, then, cyber attacks against an adversary during war could be considered 
ethical if they follow the above principles. Indeed, they may be less destructive than 
many kinetic attacks, and thereby preferred on humanitarian grounds. Rather than 
dropping bombs on a computing center in order to shut down a particular service, 
thereby causing extensive property damage and possibly loss of life, one might 
 9
instead penetrate or disrupt the computer systems in a way that accomplishes the 
same military objectives but with fewer damages and long-term side effects. 
 
 
Cyber Attacks by Non-State Actors 
 
Although the law of information conflict concerns state actors and the application of 
armed force, its general principles can be applied to non-state actors who conduct 
cyber attacks for political and social reasons. This domain of conflict includes 
hacktivism, which is the convergence of hacking with activism and civil 
disobedience, and cyberterrorism, which uses hacking as a means of terrorism. In 
both cases, the objective is change of a political or social nature, but whereas the 
activist generally avoids causing physical injury or property damage, the terrorist 
seeks to kill and destroy. 
 
To apply the international law of armed conflict to this domain, recall that the jus ad 
bellum specifies what types of operations are generally considered illegitimate, 
namely operations that use force, and the conditions under which these otherwise 
illegitimate operations can be conducted—conditions that provide a lawful basis for 
engaging in otherwise prohibited behavior. The jus in bello, on the other hand, offers 
legal principles for the conduct of otherwise illegitimate operations in the face of 
conflict. The following discusses how each of these applies to hacktivism. 
 
Just Cause for Hacktivism 
 
Just as jus ad bellum specifies operations that states are not allowed to initiate against 
each other during the normal course of events, namely operations that use force, 
domestic laws specify operations that non-state actors are not allowed to conduct. In 
the United States, the laws governing cyber attacks are embodied primarily in Title 
18, Section 1030 of the U.S. Code (at the federal level) and in state computer crime 
laws. These laws generally prohibit most cyber attacks, including denial-of-service 
attacks, web defacements, network intrusions, and the use of malicious code such as 
viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. 
 
Jus ad bellum allows states to engage in otherwise illegitimate operations that use 
force in order to defend themselves or, under the auspices of the UN, other states that 
are threatened. Domestic legal doctrine also incorporates a notion of self-defense that 
allows victims to use force that otherwise would be unlawful. Since the use of cyber 
attacks as a means of self-defense is covered later, this section focuses on other 
conditions that might provide ethical grounds for politically and socially-minded 
hackers to engage in cyber attacks. 
 
One area where hacktivism may be morally justified is civil disobedience, which is 
the active refusal to obey certain laws and demands of a government through 
nonviolent means. Civil disobedience is conducted to protest and draw attention to 
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laws, policies, and practices that are considered unjust or unethical. It employs such 
means as peaceful demonstrations, blockades, sit-ins, and trespass. Civil disobedience 
involves breaking laws, but it is an area where violating a law does not necessarily 
imply immoral behavior. When Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on the bus, she 
committed an act of civil disobedience that was morally permissible as well as 
courageous. Acts of civil disobedience are not necessarily ethical, however. For 
example, it would be unethical to block the entrance to a hospital emergency room in 
order to protest the government’s health care policy. 
 
The concept of civil disobedience was extended to cyberspace in the mid-90s. Stefan 
Wray, founder of the New York based Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT), credits 
the Critical Arts Ensemble, which produced two documents, “Electronic 
Disturbance” in 1994 and “Electronic Civil Disobedience” in 1996. According to 
Wray, the Critical Arts Ensemble argued that activists needed to think about how they 
could apply blockade and trespass in digital and electronic forms. (Wray, 1998)  
 
EDT promoted the application of electronic civil disobedience, mainly through “web 
sit-ins,” which were viewed as virtual forms of physical sit-ins and blockades. Each 
sit-in targeted one or more websites at a specified date and time, and was announced 
in advance in a public forum. To participate, activists would go to a website and 
select a target. This would cause a Java applet called Flood Net to be downloaded 
onto their computers and generate traffic against the selected website. Although the 
traffic generated by a single participant would have little effect on the performance of 
the target website, when thousands participated, as they did, the combined traffic 
could disrupt service at the target. EDT initially used their web sit-ins to demonstrate 
solidarity with the Mexican Zapatistas and protest Mexican and U.S. government 
policies affecting the Chiapas, but later went on to support numerous other causes. 
The concept was also picked up by other activists, including the U.K.-based 
Electrohippies. As web sit-ins became popular, the groups also developed more 
sophisticated flooding software, including software that could be downloaded in 
advance and run directly from participant machines, and software that required active 
involvement on the part of the participant (e.g., moving the mouse around).  
 
To assess the lawfulness of web sit-ins and other forms of hacktivism, Schmitt’s 
criteria for determining whether a cyber attack resembles the use of force vs softer, 
more legitimate measures are useful. In the domain of activism, legitimate measures 
include such things as letter writing campaigns, petitions, lobbying, publications, and 
speaking out. These forms of protest generally come out low on Schmitt’s criteria. 
They do not cause damage and hence are not severe. Their effects are not immediate 
or direct, and they are hard to measure. They are not particularly invasive and are 
often carried out at a distance (e.g., public writing and speaking). They are presumed 




One justification for following this approach is that there is a class of crimes called 
“violent crimes” that are singled out for their gravity. These crimes use or threaten to 
use violent force against their victims, and include murder, rape, robbery, and assault. 
In addition, the concept of civil disobedience expressly calls for the use of 
“nonviolent” means. Thus, it seems reasonable to evaluate forms of hacktivism in 
terms of the degree to which they resemble the application of violent force, which is 
effectively the same as armed force in the domain of jus ad bellum. An alternative 
approach would be to compare acts of electronic civil disobedience with physical acts 
of civil disobedience such as trespass and blockades. However, this begs the question 
of whether the physical acts themselves are ethical. It would be instructive to use 
Schmitt’s criteria to assess such physical acts of civil disobedience, but that is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
 
Using Schmitt’s criteria, let us consider a web sit-in that is publicly announced in 
advance, is scheduled to last one hour, and produces a noticeable degradation in 
service. In terms of severity, it would likely rank low, assuming the target is not 
providing some critical service. Immediacy, however, would be fairly high, as the 
effects, if noticed at all, would arise once a critical mass joined the sit-in. Directness 
would also be high. Although impaired performance at the website could be 
attributed to network problems or increased interest in material posted on the website, 
the prior announcement of the sit-in all but rules out other explanations. Invasiveness 
is moderate, but measurability is high, as it is straightforward to measure the 
performance degradation at the target. Presumptive legitimacy is low to moderate. 
Even though it is generally against the law to intentionally disrupt service, the effects 
produced by any individual participant are neither particularly disruptive nor clearly 
illegal, and the effects as a whole may be minor (indeed, many sit-ins have produced 
no noticeable effects). Finally, responsibility is moderate. Although it may be easy to 
determine the group responsible for organizing the sit-in from the public 
announcement, it would be difficult to determine individual participants. In sum, one 
measure is low (severity), two are high (immediacy and measurability), and four are 
in the middle (directness, invasiveness, presumptive legitimacy, and responsibility). 
Thus, web sit-ins do not look all that legitimate, falling somewhere between lawful 
measures and the illegal use of force.  
 
Indeed, their legitimacy has been questioned by other activists. Following the EDT’s 
sit-ins against the Mexican president’s website in 1998, for example, the Mexican 
civil rights group Ame la Paz objected, saying that the use of hacking tools was 
counterproductive and dangerous. Another group, the Cult of the Dead Cow, 
criticized the Electrohippies for their sit-ins, arguing that they violated their 
opponents’ rights of free speech and assembly. For their part, the E-Hippies justified 
their actions on the grounds that they substituted their opponent’s forced deficit of 
speech with broad debate on the issues. They also attempted to justify a planned web-
sit-in as part of their April 2000 “E-Resistance is Fertile” campaign against 
genetically modified foods by asking visitors to their website to vote on whether to 
carry out the planned web sit-in. When only 42% voted in support, they cancelled the 
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action. However, they did not offer this option with other web sit-ins, including a 
massive three-day sit-in against the World Trade Organization in late 1999 in 
conjunction with the Seattle protests. 
 
Another form of hacktivism is the web defacement. Although most web defacements 
are not conducted for political or social reasons, they have become a popular tool of 
protest, accounting for tens of thousands of digital attacks. Outrage over the Danish 
cartoons of the prophet Mohammed alone generated almost 3,000 defacements of 
Danish websites. (Waterman, 2006) 
 
One of the earliest defacements took place in 1996 against the US Department of 
Justice website. The hackers used the attack to protest the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA), which made it illegal to make indecent material available to minors on 
the Internet. The defaced website was re-titled “US Department of Injustice” and 
displayed the message “this page is in violation of the Communications Decency 
Act!” It also included pornographic images and information about the First 
Amendment and the CDA. (Attrition, 1996) By displaying pornographic material on 
a website accessible to children, the cyber attack violated the very act that was 
considered unjust. Considering that the CDA was subsequently struck down as 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, one might argue that the defacement was a 
reasonable response. However, the defacement also violated computer crime laws, 
making it much more difficult to justify. 
 
Most web defacements violate computer crime statutes. Examining them in terms of 
Schmitt’s criteria, they score high on four: immediacy, directness, measurability, and 
presumptive legitimacy. Severity may be low, as websites generally can be readily 
restored from backups, but it could be high if the defacement, for example, causes 
visitors to the site to use erroneous medical information or give up bank account 
information, or if it severely undermines confidence in the organization owning the 
website. Invasiveness is moderate, and responsibility is low, in that few countries 
claim responsibility for such actions.  Not everyone is capable of defacing a website, 
but there are tens of thousands of hackers who are. In sum, defacements look even 
less legitimate than web sit-ins, and indeed are scorned by many hacktivists. 
 
Other forms of hacktivism can be examined through Schmitt’s criteria. In general, 
those actions that violate computer crime statutes come out moderate to high, 
implying their general illegitimacy laws aside. These include cyber attacks to take 
down websites that traffic in child pornography, and attacks aimed at exposing – and 
correcting – security vulnerabilities. Even though the ends may be worthy, the means 
are questionable at best. Acts that would qualify as cyberterrorism would come out 
high on severity at the very least. 
 
By comparison, cyber actions that do not violate computer crime laws come out low 
on Schmitt’s criteria. Examples include E-Hippies’ development and use of software 
to facilitate letter writing campaigns and Hacktivismo’s development of software for 
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getting information censored in China past China’s firewalls. These activities are 
lawful (at least in the United States) and do not resemble the use of force.  
 
Cyber attacks that fall in the middle to upper ranges of Schmitt’s criteria are not 
necessarily unethical, but they are harder to justify. One factor that might be useful is 
whether the activist’s objectives could be achieved by lawful means. For example, 
consider again the defacement protesting the CDA. The hacker could have displayed 
his message on his own website or, with permission, another party’s website, and 
doing so would have given it a longer “shelf life.” Defaced sites are rarely up for 
more than a short time, although they may be mirrored in an archive, as was the case 
here. The defacement got press coverage that otherwise would have been unlikely, 
but the criminal act is hard to justify given that civil liberties groups were working 
hard to overturn the CDA through the courts (as they succeeded in doing). Indeed, the 
defacement could have undermined the legal efforts by linking the civil liberties 
objectives to illegal hacking.  
 
Conduct of Hacktivism 
 
The seven principles of jus in bello provide guidance for using force and, by 
extension, for engaging in cyber attacks that resemble force. 
  
The first principle, distinction of combatants from noncombatants, states that only 
members of a nation’s regular armed forces may use force, and that they must 
distinguish themselves from civilians and not hide behind civilian shields. This 
principle would prohibit activists from engaging in any form of cyber attack that 
resembles force. If we interpret web sit-ins and defacements as something less than 
force, then they might be allowed, however, we might reasonably as that the activists 
identify themselves or their sponsoring organization so that any response is not 
directed at innocent parties, including governments. Indeed, the organizers of EDT 
used their real names and talked about their philosophy and actions in public forum. 
The E-Hippies were also fairly open, and both groups openly acknowledged 
responsibility for the web sit-ins they organized. Although the tens of thousands of 
people who participated in their sit-ins did not individually identify themselves by 
name, participation in the sit-in itself implied an affiliation of sorts with the 
sponsoring organization. Web defacers also identify themselves, although typically 
by hacker group names and individual aliases that are not explicitly linked to their 
real names. But the level of identification is sufficient for an observer to see that the 
action was performed by a particular group of hackers and not a government. 
 
The second principle, military necessity, requires that the amount of force employed 
not exceed the requirements of a lawful strike against a legitimate target. Given that 
most web sit-ins are conducted against the government agency or company whose 
policies are the target of protest, they could be interpreted as being consistent with the 
objective of avoiding collateral damage. However, there have been exceptions. For 
example, within their broad mission to help the Mexican Chiapas, EDT conducted a 
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web sit-in against the Frankfurt Stock Exchange on the grounds that it represented 
capitalism’s role in globalization, which they claimed was “at the root of the Chiapas’ 
problems.” (Denning, 2001) While the connection seems far-fetched, the sit-in did 
raise this as an issue, which the EDT might have thought necessary to their mission. 
Indeed, EDT subsequently sponsored several web sit-ins over globalization issues. 
 
A web sit-in can be viewed as a relatively mild form of denial-of-service attack that 
affects its target directly. However, there are other types of DoS attacks that leverage 
third party computers to amplify their affects. For example, in a distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attack, thousands of third party computers may be compromised and 
instructed to attack the target. As the compromised machines serve as a shield to 
protect the source of attack, this would violate the principle of distinguishing 
combatants from noncombatants. 
 
Many web defacements have been directed only against the government or 
organization that was the subject of complaint. For example, the Department of 
Justice, which was the target of the CDA protest mentioned earlier, had supported 
and defended the CDA. However, numerous other defacements have been against 
targets that had little if any direct connection to the grievance. Of the almost 3,000 
Danish websites defaced in conjunction with the protest against the Danish 
newspaper that published the cartoons and the government’s response, most belonged 
to civilian organizations and companies that had nothing to do with the newspaper or 
government action. However, the attacks did generate press coverage, in part because 
of their magnitude, likely drawing greater attention to the complaint than simply 
defacing one or two government sites would have done. Roberto Preatoni, founder 
and administrator of Zone-h, which recorded the defacements, said that “This is the 
biggest, most intense assault” he had ever seen. (Waterman, 2006) In general, hackers 
might justify their defacements of civilian websites on two grounds: first, because the 
civilian sites were the only ones they could successfully hack, and second, by hacking 
more sites, they could generate more publicity. 
  
The principle of proportionality requires that any unintentional but unavoidable injury 
to noncombatants or damage to their property be proportionate to mission benefits. 
Returning to the EDT example above, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange reported that it 
was aware of the protest but believed it had not affected its servers. (Denning, 2001) 
Hence, the sit-in could be considered proportionate to benefits achieved, which 
arguably were small. By comparison, DDoS attacks affect potentially thousands of 
noncombatant computers without necessarily meeting mission objectives any better 
than a sit-in, which does not harm third party computers. Similarly, web defacements 
against noncombatant servers produce noticeable effects and take time to repair. 
Besides removing the vulnerability that was exploited and -restoring the home page, 
system administrators must check for other damage and remove any backdoors and 
malicious code left behind by the hackers. It is harder to argue that such defacements 
are proportionate to the protestors’ gains. 
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Hacktivists have employed indiscriminate computer viruses and worms to 
disseminate protest messages. These would violate the general principle of avoiding 
indiscriminate weapons. However, one of the earliest worms, Worms Against 
Nuclear Killers (WANK), stayed within the network of NASA, the target of the 
protest. The protestors objected to the nuclear power unit for the Galileo probe.  
 
There do not appear to be cases of hacktivists causing superfluous injury or violating 
the principle of perfidy. Cyber criminals, however, have exploited protected symbols, 
including the Red Cross logo, for financial gain (e.g., through bogus fund raisers).  
 
The principle of neutrality implies that activists should not launch cyber attacks 
against neutral states or third parties. While sponsoring web sit-ins to protest the 
Mexican government’s treatment of the Chiapas, the EDT conducted sit-ins against 
U.S. government sites as well as Mexican ones. However, they justified the U.S. sit-
ins on the grounds that U.S. policies supported the Mexican government at the 
expense of the Chiapas. 
 
Other Ethical Frameworks for Hacktivism 
 
Mark Manion and Abby Goodrum offer five necessary conditions for acts of civil 
disobedience, and by extension electronic civil disobedience, to be ethically justified. 
(Manion and Goodman, 2000) They are: 
 
1. No damage done to persons or property 
2. Non-violent 
3. Not for personal profit 
4. Ethical motivation—i.e., the strong conviction that a law is unjust, unfair, or 
to the extreme detriment of the common good 
5. Willingness to accept personal responsibility for outcome of actions 
 
Manion and Goodrum’s analysis of several acts of hacktivism suggests they regard 
web sit-ins, defacements, and some other forms of ethically motivated cyber attacks 
to be justifiable. However, their analysis ignores their first condition of no damage. 
Defacements in particular cause information property damage that is analogous to 
physical property damage (both require resources to repair).  
 
The overall approach taken by Manion and Goodrum differs substantially from the 
law of war approach taken in this paper. The first principle of jus in bello, which 
states that combatants distinguish themselves, is similar to their fifth condition of 
accepting responsibility, but the other six principles of jus in bello—necessity, 
proportionality, indiscriminate or superfluous weapons, perfidy, and neutrality – are 
left out. Instead, Manion and Goodrum rely mainly on the ethical motivations of the 
hacktivists, taking an “ends justifies the means” approach, at least as long as the 
attack does not fall in the domain of cyberterrorism. 
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Kenneth Himma also offers five conditions that weigh in favor of acts of civil 
disobedience being ethically justified: (Himma, 2006a) 
 
1. The act is committed openly by properly motivated persons willing to accept 
responsibility for the act. 
2. The position is a plausible one that is, at the very least, in play among open-
minded, reasonable persons in the relevant community. 
3. Persons committing the act are in possession of a thoughtful justification for 
both the position and the act. 
4. The act does not result in significant damage to the interests of innocent third 
parties. 
5. The act is reasonably calculated to stimulate and advance debate on the issue. 
 
Himma’s conditions are stronger than Manion and Goodrum’s, examining means 
(condition 4) as well as end objectives. However, although Himma’s fourth condition 
relates to several jus in bello principles, it offers fewer distinctions. 
 
Neither framework appeals to jus ad bellum for assessing just cause and comparing 
cyber attacks with acts of force, which are generally forbidden by state as well as 
non-state actors. On the other hand, both frameworks offer an additional 
consideration for determining just cause, namely ethical motivation. Further, Himma 
goes further and asks that activists provide justification for their position and actions; 
that the position itself be considered plausible by open minded, reasonable persons in 
the relevant community; and that the actions be designed to foster debate. Himma’s 
framework is complementary to the law of war framework offered by this paper. 
 
 
Active Response and Hack Back 
 
“Hack back” is a form of active response that uses hacking to counter a cyber attack. 
There are two principal forms. The first involves using invasive tracebacks in order to 
locate the source of an attack. The second involves striking back at an attacking 
machine in order to shut it down or at least cause it to stop attacking.  
 
The Doctrine of Self-Defense 
 
At the state level, the doctrine of self-defense is based on jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, which together allow states to use force in self-defense, but constrain how that 
force is applied.  
 
An analogous legal doctrine of self-defense allows non-state actors to use force in 
order to protect themselves from imminent bodily harm or, under some 
circumstances, to protect their property from damage. According to Curtis Karnow, 
formerly Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Criminal Division, the test is whether: 
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1. There is an apparent necessity to use force. 
2. The force used is reasonable. 
3. The threatened act is unlawful. 
 
The necessity condition requires that there be a good faith subjective, and objectively 
reasonable, belief that there were no alternatives to the counterstrike. The 
reasonableness condition requires that the harm produced by the counter attack be 
proportional to the harm avoided. (Karnow, 2003) Reasonableness would also 
encompass other principles from jus in bello, including neutrality, indiscriminate 
weapons, superfluous injury, and perfidy, as counterstrikes that violated these 
principles would seem unreasonable. Karnow observes that while self-defense is a 
privilege of state rather than federal law, it might protect the defender from 
prosecution under the federal computer crime statute, which prohibits unauthorized 
access, on the grounds that self-help provides the requisite authorization. (Karnow, 
2003) 
 
Karnow also suggests that the legal doctrine of nuisance could justify a counterstrike 
against cyber nuisances such as viruses and worms. Under nuisance law, a person 
affected by a nuisance can, as a last resort, use force or other means of self-help to 
abate or stop it. (Karnow, 2003) 
 
The doctrine of self-defense does not justify retaliatory strikes that are motivated by 
revenge or a desire to get even. The response must be necessary to counter the threat. 
To illustrate, in the midst of the Electrohippies’ three-day web sit-in against the 
World Trade Organization’s website in 1999, the ISP hosting the WTO site, 
Conexion, conducted a counterstike against the Electrohippies’ site. Conexion’s 
server was configured to retransmit all of the attack packets back to the 
Electrohippies’ website, from where they had originated, thereby shutting it down. 
Himma argues that the strike back was retaliatory and unnecessary, as Conexion 
could have simply dropped the incoming attack packets. (Himma, 2006b) Further, the 
response had a side effect of motivating the E-hippies to develop sit-in software that 
could be launched directly from their participants’ computers, without the need to go 
through a central portal. Arguably, this made it more difficult for victims of future sit-
ins to defend themselves, as there is no central source for the attack; indeed, such sit-
ins more closely resemble DDoS attacks. As another example, the U.S. Department 
of Defense engaged in active response against a web sit-in conducted by the EDT in 
1998. In their case, they redirected the browsers of participants using the EDT portal 
to a web page with a hostile applet, which caused the participant’s computers to go 
into an endless loop trying to reload a document. (Denning, 2001) The counterstrike 
raised legal and ethical issues (some participants claimed they lost data), and the 
Department of Defense did not deploy similar measures in response to future sit-ins. 
 
Besides self-defense and retaliation/punishment, Himma considers an ethical 
principle for active response based on the need to secure a significantly greater 
common good, which might justify aggressive measures. However, he cautions that 
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such justification can be problematic because of potential unanticipated side effects. 
He also argues that persons engaging in active response are morally bound to have 
sufficient reason to believe they are acting on ethical principles. (Himma 2006) 
 
Hack Back and Force 
 
For both state and non-state actors, the doctrine of self-defense allows the application 
of force against force and threats of force. In general, offensive operations that use 
less than force call for responses that use less than force. However, even when the 
offensive act uses force, defensive responses that use less than force are generally 
preferred over those that use force. Thus, it is useful to know the extent to which 
active response resembles force vs. more legitimate means, the latter being easier to 
justify on ethical grounds. 
 
To determine the degree to which a particular means of active response resembles 
force, we again turn to Schmitt’s criteria. Consider first an invasive traceback such as 
the one conducted by Shawn Carpenter in Titan Rain. Carpenter traced an intrusion 
into Sandia Labs and Department of Defense computers back to a province in China. 
Although the details have not been made public, for the purpose of analysis, assume 
he had to hack back through computers that were not directly responsible for the 
intrusion in order to locate the source, as this is typical in cyber attacks.  
 
In terms of Schmitt’s criteria, severity is low. Indeed, the owners of intermediate 
machines may not observe any effects or even know of the traceback, especially if 
they had not noticed the intrusion from China in the first place. Given that the effects 
could go unnoticed unless and until system logs are examined, it seems reasonable to 
rate immediacy low as well. Measurability is also low in that there is not much to 
measure. Directness is low to moderate, as it could be hard to attribute the effects of 
the intrusive traceback to an active response (vs. some other computer intrusion). 
Invasiveness is moderate, as in all cyber attacks. Responsibility is also moderate, as 
some skill is required to conduct an effective traceback, but attribution is difficult.  
 
To assess presumptive legitimacy, we need to know who is conducting the invasive 
traceback and who owns the machines being hacked. If the traceback is conducted by 
a state actor against foreign systems, presumptive legitimacy should be low in that the 
entire operation falls in the domain of foreign intelligence collection, which is 
generally considered legitimate. If the traceback involves accessing a domestic 
computer, the state may need additional authorities to access the system. However, if 
the traceback is conducted by a non-state actor, the operation likely violates computer 
crime statutes, although the offense may be minor if no sensitive information was 
downloaded or files damaged. But even if we rate presumptive legitimacy moderate 
or high, the invasive traceback as a whole looks less like force than the cyber attacks 
examined earlier in this paper. This is consistent with Himma’s argument that 
tracebacks are not properly characterized as force. (Himma, 2004) 
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Next, consider an operation that aims to stop a machine from participating in a DoS 
attack. Suppose that the attacking machine is not even the source of the attack, but 
rather a victim itself of an earlier compromise. Finally, suppose that the method of 
stopping the machine from engaging in the attack involves removing malicious code 
that had been planted on the machine. Severity is low—indeed, removing the 
malicious code should improve the state of the machine. Immediacy, however, is 
high: once the malicious code is deleted, the attack packets stop. Directness is 
moderate, as the attack packets could stop for other reasons. (e.g., the malicious code 
could be programmed to only attack for one hour on a particular day). Invasiveness is 
also moderate. Measurability is high, as the before and after attack packets can be 
counted. Presumptive legitimacy is high, as it is normally illegal to tamper with other 
peoples’ machines. Finally, responsibility is moderate. In sum, this operation looks 
more like force than an intrusive traceback, with at least three criteria (immediacy, 
measurability, and presumptive legitimacy) ranking high. As a result, it would seem 
harder to justify on ethical grounds. Even though the attack may appear noble—after 
all, malicious code is removed—it is also more dangerous. Deleting code can 
introduce problems, as anyone who has had difficulty uninstalling software has 
learned the hard way. By comparison, one is less likely to cause damage during 
traceback. 
 
Conduct of Hack Back 
 
Consider again the traceback operation from the perspective of jus in bello and the 
legal doctrine of self-defense. In both cases, a critical question is whether the 
traceback is necessary for self-defense. Clearly, the operation itself will not stop the 
attack. Indeed, the most effective way of stopping most attacks is through improved 
security. However, traceback may be necessary to find and stop a perpetrator who is 
exploiting an undetermined vulnerability, as the solution would be unknown. 
Although the machine could simply be disconnected from the Internet, the effect 
could be worse than the attack itself, resulting in lost productivity and income. In 
addition, traceback is necessary to find and then stop the perpetrator from going after 
other targets and causing greater damage. Further, at the state level, traceback may be 
necessary to identify the source of foreign intelligence collection against one’s own 
country. Finding that source may be important for national security. 
 
An alternative to traceback is to hand the problem over to law enforcement, but it 
may be months before law enforcement can even get to the case, let alone solve it. 
Further, the perpetrator of the attack may have exploited computers in several 
countries before eventually attacking a particular target, and getting law enforcement 
agencies in these countries to all participate in the investigation is challenging at best. 
Moreover, by the time law enforcement responds, the perpetrator may have 
conducted additional, more serious attacks that could have been averted with a more 
timely response. Thus, a reasonable argument can be made that at least in certain 
circumstances, invasive traceback is necessary for a prompt response. 
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For similar reasons, a traceback that involves invading computers belonging to a 
neutral country or organization could be warranted if the neutral party is unable or 
unwilling to stop its own systems from being exploited in the cyber attack in a timely 
manner. 
 
With respect to proportionality, the seriousness of the cyber attack must be 
considered along with whether any collateral damage from the traceback is 
proportional to the harm averted. Whereas traceback may not be justified to defend 
against a web defacement, it may be appropriate for locating an intruder who has 
been penetrating a network and downloading sensitive information for months or 
surreptitiously tampering with or deleting critical data. 
 
With respect to the principles of indiscriminate weapons, superfluous injury, and 
perfidy, a traceback operation would seem to be in compliance. However, it would 
not satisfy the principle of distinguishing combatants from non-combatants if the 
traceback is conducted surreptitiously with the goal of avoiding detection and 
attribution. To satisfy the principle, the traceback would have to be conducted openly, 
ideally with permission. 
 
While the above suggests that invasive tracebacks could be ethically justified in 
accordance with the principles of self-defense, Himma argued that they are not. 
(Himma, 2004) He based his conclusion on the grounds that they did nothing to either 
repel or prevent an attack. He further reasoned that tracebacks can locate the source 
only in direct attacks staged from the hacker’s machine, and, therefore, are unlikely to 
achieve the greater good of identifying the culpable parties. His argument assumes 
that a traceback identifies the source of a particular IP packet, but not necessarily the 
source of the attack. In a later paper, Himma observed that improvements in 
traceback technologies that allow source identification could lead to a different 
conclusion. (Himma, 2006b) 
 
Now, consider the hack back to remove malicious code from the victim machine 
engaged in the DoS attack. A case for necessity is harder to make, as an alternative 
course of action would be to notify the owner of the machine of the attack and ask 
that the machine be taken off the network until the code is repaired. Since most 
owners would not want to risk being held liable for damages caused by their 
machines, this approach should be effective, although some effort might be required 
to determine the machine’s owner or get an ISP to notify the owner of a machine on 
its network. Another course of action would be to get the machines’ ISP to block the 
attack packets, which at least would stop the immediate attack. 
 
It is also harder to make a case for satisfying the principle of proportionality, given 
that the hack back to remove the malicious code could potentially damage the victim 
machine beyond that already caused by the presence of the code, and the operation 
has no affect on eliminating the original source of the attack. The perpetrator could 
find another victim and resume the DoS attack from the new base of operation.  
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With respect to the principle of neutrality, the hack back is also difficult to justify if 
the victim machine is in a neutral country or owned by a neutral third party. The 
alternative of notifying the machine’s owner or ISP would be a better choice. 
 
The hack back does not involve the use of indiscriminate or superfluous weapons. 
Nor does it involve perfidy. However, unless done openly, it would fail to distinguish 
combatants from noncombatants. The owner of the victim machine would not know 
who had hacked the machine. In sum, the hack back to remove code appears less 
consistent with the doctrine of self-defense than the invasive traceback, and thus 





This paper has explored the ethics of cyber attacks in three domains of conflict: cyber 
warfare at the state level, hacktivism conducted by non-state actors, and active 
response. It reviewed how the international law of armed conflict has been interpreted 
to cover cyber actions in the context of state-level conflict, and then showed how the 
resulting framework can be applied to non-state actors and active response. 
 
The framework requires making two determinations: first, whether a particular cyber 
attack resembles force, and second, whether the attack follows the principles of the 
law of war. In general, the less an attack looks like force and the more it adheres to 
the law of war principles, the easier it is to justify ethically. However, attacks that 
look like force are generally permissible for defensive purposes, so they cannot be 
ruled out. 
 
To determine the degree to which a particular cyber attack resembles force, the 
framework uses criteria identified by Michael Schmitt and promoted by Thomas 
Wingfield. These criteria were developed to distinguish operations that use armed 
force from softer, more legitimate forms of influence at the state level.  
 
The framework is not intended as a sole instrument for making ethical judgments, but 
rather as a starting point based on well-established principles. Others have proposed 
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